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ABSTRACT
Many medical decisions are “preference sensitive,” where
the best choice depends on the values a specific patient
places on relevant outcomes. For example, a decision may
require a patient to make a trade-off between a small in-
crease in chance for survival and a large out-of-pocket ex-
pense. In such situations, patients need to understand the
costs and benefits of the health care alternative, in order to
decide the best course of action. However, findings from
decision science research have demonstrated that people’s
decisions are often influenced not only by their perceptions
of these costs and benefits, but also by subtle contextual
factors that trigger intuitive and emotional decision pro-
cesses. In this article, I describe some of these contextual
factors, and lay out the challenges these factors raise for
clinicians’ efforts to help their patients make informed de-
cisions. The Oncologist 2010;15(suppl 1):5–10
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, exciting new treatments have entered on-
cology practice, treatments that have increased survival
rates among people with life-threatening cancers. Unfortu-
nately, some of these treatments are extremely expensive,
requiring doctors and patients to decide whether the clinical
benefits brought by these treatments outweigh their costs.
Many oncologists feel uncomfortable factoring these fi-
nancial costs into their clinical decisions [1]. They struggle
to figure out the best way to communicate about such issues
with their patients. However, difficult trade-offs have long
been common in oncology settings. Oncology patients have
had to choose between quantity and quality of life, for ex-
ample, and between short- and long-term survival. Indeed,
clinicians have increasingly recognized that the “best”
choice for any given oncology patient often depends on the
values that specific patients place on relevant health out-
comes.
Given that trade-offs have long been a critical part of on-
cology decision making, the arrival of expensive new on-
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cology treatments may seem, on the surface, to be just one
more cost to throw into the clinical equation. By this view,
oncologists should make sure their patients understand
the costs and benefits of their treatment alternatives, with
the costs they describe to patients encompassing not only the
side effects of the treatment but also the financial impact of
treatment. Armed with this broader set of information, it
would seem that patients should be able to work together
with their clinicians to weigh these costs and benefits, and
to choose the treatment that best fits their goals.
In this article, I explain why patients’ decisions are not
so simple. Specifically, I explore the role that intuition and
emotion play in the way people process cost and benefit in-
formation.
Experts have long recognized that health care decisions
are influenced by people’s emotions. But they have only re-
cently begun to recognize that whenever people think their
way through decisions, they feel their way too [2–5]. As
people cogitate about the pros and cons of their decision al-
ternatives, the affective centers of their brain also react to
those same pros and cons [6]. Sometimes these two pro-
cesses agree. When they do not, however, in many cases it
is the affective centers that rule the day [2].
The role of affect in decision making raises fundamental
challenges for cancer risk communicators. In the absence of
affect, for example, oncologists could involve cancer pa-
tients in their health care decisions by taking the time to
communicate the risks and benefits of their treatment al-
ternatives, checking to make sure patients understand the
information and have time to integrate that information
with their individual preferences. This would be no sim-
ple task, because oncologists would need to overcome
many barriers to help the patients understand their situ-
ations. But in the presence of affect, this challenge be-
comes even larger.
Below, I describe a number of studies that reveal some
of the roles that emotion, or affect, can play in people’s de-
cisions about cancer care. (For the purposes of this arti-
cle, I use the terms emotion and affect interchangeably.)
In the process, I explore some of the special challenges
clinicians are likely to encounter as they attempt to in-
corporate the financial costs of treatment into their clin-
ical discussions.
WEIGHING COSTS AND BENEFITS
To illustrate the general theme of this article, consider the
following hypothetical scenario, which my colleagues and I
have posed to a large number of lay people and clinicians.
In this scenario, we ask people to imagine that they have
been diagnosed with colon cancer, and that without
treatment they will die. We then describe two treatment
options to them, which we call surgery 1 and surgery 2
[7]. The risks and benefits of these two surgeries are
shown in Table 1.
How should people decide between surgery 1 and sur-
gery 2? The dominant view among decision-making ex-
perts is that people ought to make decisions like this by
weighing the costs and benefits of each option—by think-
ing about the probability of each possible outcome and the
value they place on each of these outcomes. This view is the
basis of decision analysis [8], the health belief model [9],
and economic theories of rationality [10, 11]. As such, this
view emphasizes explicit cognitive judgments—the ratio-
nal weighing of pros and cons.
Returning to Table 1, the pros and cons of the two sur-
geries are clear. Both provide an 80% chance of surviving
the cancer without complications. The cure rate of the two
surgeries, however, differs. Surgery 2 yields a 20% death
rate from cancer, whereas surgery 1 yields only a 16% death
rate. The remaining 4% of the people receiving surgery 1 do
not die of their cancer but, instead, survive with some kind
of temporary or permanent surgical complication. The two
treatments, in other words, involve a trade-off between ac-
cepting the chance for these complications and accepting a
higher chance for death. The decision depends on what peo-
ple think about dying from cancer versus living with either
of these surgical complications.
As it turns out, most people have little difficulty saying
what they think about this trade-off. When faced with a
choice between dying and living with a colostomy, 90%
of the people we surveyed said they would choose to live
with the colostomy. They feel even stronger about their
preference for the other three surgical outcomes, compared
with death. In fact, 90% of the people we surveyed pre-
ferred each of the four surgical complications to death.
Based on these values, it seems obvious that surgery 1 is
the best treatment for 90% of people. And yet in our stud-
Table 1. Hypothetical treatment options for colon cancer
Treatment options
Possible outcome Surgery 1 Surgery 2
Cure without complications 80% 80%
Cure with colostomy 1%
Cure with chronic diarrhea 1%
Cure with intermittent bowel
obstruction
1%
Cure with wound infection 1%
No cure (death) 16% 20%
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ies we have found that, when given this choice, a majority
of people choose surgery 2 [12].
Why do they make this choice?
DECISION BIASES AND EMOTION
Until recently, most decision scientists assumed that errors
like these had to be caused by cognitive limitations that led
to biased decision making [13]. In fact, over the past 40
years, researchers in the field of judgment and decision
making have been documenting the many different ways
that people’s judgments and decisions fall short of rational
ideals. In particular, researchers have demonstrated that
people are not good at generating accurate probability esti-
mates. Their estimates are susceptible to phenomena such
as anchoring biases [14] and availability biases [15]. And
they have learned that people’s cognitive capacities are lim-
ited, in ways that make it difficult for them to weight com-
plex costs and benefits in a rational manner [16]. They
cannot “do the math” well enough to factor in all the deci-
sion-relevant trade-offs [17].
But do these cognitive limitations explain people’s
choices in our hypothetical colon cancer decision? Proba-
bly not. In a series of studies, my research team has tested
for potential cognitive biases that could explain people’s
choices in this scenario [12]. For example, we tested
whether people were confused by our colon cancer sce-
nario, and discovered that most people understand the sce-
nario quite well. In fact, we even found that physicians
choose surgery 2 almost as often as the general public (un-
published data). Why the strange choices, then? I expect
that people feel that surgery 2 is better for them, even
though their own preferences tell them that surgery 1 is the
best choice. Feeling and thinking do not always point peo-
ple in the same direction. For example, Denes-Raj et al. [18]
gave people a chance to win money by picking a jelly bean
from one of two bowls, offering them $1 if they chose a red
jelly bean. The first bowl contained nine red beans in 100
and was labeled (accurately) as having 9% red beans. The
second bowl contained one red bean in 10 and was labeled
as having 10% red beans. Many people in this study re-
ported knowing that the second bowl gave them the best
chance for winning, but feeling like the first bowl gave them
a better chance because it contained a larger number of red
beans. And many people were compelled by these feelings
to choose from the first bowl.
We have encountered this type of reasoning frequently
when discussing our colon cancer scenario. Many people
tell us that they know that the first surgery is better than the
second, but feel that they should still choose surgery 2, so
that they won’t have to deal with the possibility of experi-
encing a surgical complication. After all, descriptions of
things like having a colostomy or a wound infection are af-
fect-rich, evoking strong feelings of fear or disgust. It is
hardly surprising that the prospect of experiencing these
conditions evokes an avoidance reaction. But this is only
one example of a much more general phenomenon. As I
demonstrate in the next few studies, risk information is
rarely received dispassionately, but is usually processed by
people in affective and intuitive ways, too. Risks create
feelings.
THE HAZARDS OF EDUCATION
Consider how a seemingly innocuous pretest influences the
“feel” of breast cancer risk [19]. We asked a group of
women to estimate the average woman’s lifetime risk of
breast cancer. According to the National Cancer Institute,
the actual risk is approximately 13%. However, most
women in our study estimated that the risk was much higher
than this figure, with a mean estimate of 41%. Concerned
about such misestimates, which have been demonstrated in
numerous studies [19–23], health care researchers have de-
veloped communication interventions, designed to improve
people’s risk perceptions. In one such intervention, Lerman
et al. [20] asked women to estimate their lifetime risk of be-
ing diagnosed with breast cancer, then educated these
women about their actual risk. At the end of this educational
intervention, the researchers determined that women were
significantly more accurate in reporting their own risk. The
educational intervention, in other words, had worked. But
unfortunately, at the same time, they discovered that many
women had lost interest in receiving mammograms [20].
I believe that women in this study lost interest in mam-
mography because the 13% figure felt low to them, com-
pared with the numbers they estimated. In fact, my
colleagues and I conducted a study exploring whether the
pretest, itself, influenced how women respond to the com-
munication intervention. We randomized participants into
one of two groups, one of which was asked to estimate the
average woman’s risk of breast cancer before receiving the
13% figure and a second that received the 13% figure with-
out being asked to make any kind of estimate.
We found that women’s reactions to the 13% figure dif-
fered significantly across the two groups. The first group,
after overestimating the risk of breast of cancer, was more
likely to say that the 13% figure made them feel “relieved,”
and was also more likely to say that the risk struck them as
“low” (Table 2). By contrast, the second group was not par-
ticularly relieved by this information. In fact, collectively,
they exhibited what is known as a “hindsight bias” [24]—
on average, they indicated that the 13% figure was just
about what they would have guessed it to be.
This study demonstrates two important findings. First,
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guessing the risk influenced how women responded to the
risk information. This raises important concerns for studies
of communication interventions and decision aids. If re-
searchers conduct pretests prior to their interventions, they
may alter the way people perceive subsequent information.
Second, the 41% figure wasn’t already in women’s heads
when they were asked to make the estimates. If it had been,
the act of guessing would not have influenced the first
group’s subsequent reactions to the information, nor would
the second group have been susceptible to hindsight bias.
Instead, the pretest forced women to come up with a numer-
ical estimate, and this estimate then influenced their subse-
quent reaction to the actual risk information.
The researchers designing the breast cancer communi-
cation intervention were treating 13% like it was simply a
number, indicating that 13 in 100 women develop breast
cancer. By this view, 13% should be treated as being a
lower risk than 15% and a higher risk than, say, 10%. But
this view places too much emphasis on the cognitive mean-
ing of 13%, and underemphasizes the affective or intuitive
meaning of the number.
RISK: A BASIS FOR COMPARISON, NOT JUST A
NUMBER
When people receive information about cancer risks, they
do not simply encode the numbers into a mathematical al-
gorithm. They pull meaning out from the numbers, stamp-
ing the information with affective or intuitive labels such as
“high versus low” or “something to be worried about versus
something to be relieved about.” Which meaning people
take away from risk information, however, can depend on
what other statistics they know.
When a patient learns that a procedure has a 28% suc-
cess rate, that information is initially very hard to evaluate.
Is 28% good or bad? Most patients lack the domain-specific
knowledge to know. But if you tell them that an alternate
procedure has a 35% success rate, all of a sudden the 28%
rate won’t feel very good at all. In fact, providing such ad-
ditional contextual information not only changes how peo-
ple feel about their alternatives, it can change what they
choose to do [25].
To illustrate this point further, consider a study my col-
leagues and I conducted that demonstrated that the way
people encode information about risk can depend on
whether they believe their own risk is higher or lower than
average [26]. We asked women to imagine that they had a
6% risk of developing breast cancer over the next 5 years.
(We chose the 6% figure because it was the average risk of
women who had been enrolled in the P-1 Trial, a study that
showed that tamoxifen can reduce the risk of experiencing a
first breast cancer [27].) We also asked women to imagine
that they could take a pill that would cut their risk in half, to
3%. We then described several potential side effects of this
hypothetical pill: a 0.2% chance for endometrial cancer, a
0.5% chance for heart attack or stroke, and a 15% chance
for experiencing hot flashes or vaginal discharge. We asked
women how interested they would be in this pill, how wor-
ried they would be about their chance for breast cancer, and
how effective they thought the pill would be.
Whereas every woman who participated in our study re-
ceived identical risk information—all were told their own
5-year risk was 6%—we designed the study to test whether
the way women felt about both breast cancer and the pre-
vention pill would change if they were given hypothetical
information suggesting that their 6% risk was above or be-
low average. We told some participants that the average
risk of breast cancer over 5 years was 3%, and another
group that the average was 12%.
Women’s perceptions of breast cancer and of the pre-
vention pill were significantly influenced by this compara-
tive information. Those in the 3% group, who now felt at
above average risk, were more worried about their own risk
of breast cancer than the 12% group, who felt at below av-
erage risk. Indeed, the above average group also ended up
more interested in taking the pill than the other group, and
more convinced about the effectiveness of the pill.
The choice facing these women was to decide whether a
3% absolute reduction in the risk for breast cancer is a large
enough benefit to justify the risks of this pill. The compar-
ative information we provided did nothing to change either
the risks or the benefits of the pill. And yet, the comparative
information significantly influenced how women felt both
about breast cancer and about the risks and benefits of the
pill. The 6% figure was not just a number, in other words. It
was a piece of information that people coded as above or
below average.
Paul Windschitl, a psychologist at the University of
Iowa, has conducted a large number of studies that have il-
lustrated the distinction between what people believe about
risks and what they intuit about the risks [28, 29]. He con-
tends that people’s beliefs about the numeric probability of
an event, like the 6% risk for breast cancer over 5 years, are
Table 2. Effect of estimating the average woman’s






Feel relieved about risk 40% 19%
Risk perceived as low 43% 16%
8 Beyond Costs and Benefits
only part of how people perceive the risk. There is also “a
more intuitive and non-analytic component to uncertainty
that is not necessarily well represented in a numeric subjec-
tive probability response but can be an important mediator
of decisions and behavior” [29].
Providing comparative risk statistics is not the only way
to influence the intuitive meanings patients draw from risk
statistics. For example, in a study examining prenatal ge-
netic screening decisions [30], we discovered that the seem-
ingly innocuous practice of labeling a screening test result
as “negative” or “positive” significantly changed people’s
risk perceptions and their decision making about amniocen-
tesis.
MONEY TALK
I have tried to give a few examples to show the critical role
that intuition and emotions play in people’s health care de-
cisions. Giving patients information about the costs and
benefits of health-related choices won’t always lead to op-
timal decisions. Clinicians need to be aware of the subtle
contextual factors that can influence the way people per-
ceive the costs and benefits of health care interventions, and
thereby influence the health care choices people make.
Consider the costs and benefits of expensive new oncol-
ogy treatments. If patients were completely rational, then
clinicians could simply inform patients about the costs and
benefits of such treatments—with costs broadly construed
to include out-of-pocket financial costs—and patients
could decide whether the benefits of such treatments out-
weighed the costs. But human beings are not completely ra-
tional. Therefore, clinicians need to be aware of the
psychological forces that could lead patients to make sub-
optimal decisions.
For example, clinicians need to consider the typical so-
cial context of a doctor–patient interaction. The doctor en-
ters into this interaction with much more information than
the patient, and with much more experience facing the
kinds of choices that this patient must consider. The patient
may be in a high state of emotional arousal. A cancer diag-
nosis can be a shocking thing to learn about. The patient
may also be reaching the point of cognitive saturation—he
may be feeling overwhelmed by the information he needs to
consider in making an informed choice.
Add to this challenging mix a dose of financial reality,
and things can get quite dicey. You see, financial conversa-
tions are not a routine part of most clinical encounters. Out-
side settings like plastic surgery, most patients do not often
talk about the financial cost of interventions with their pro-
viders. Indeed, it is rare for doctors to talk about the cost of
care when patients face life-threatening illnesses. I expect,
for example, that many clinicians would feel uncomfortable
talking with patients about whether the benefits of an inten-
sive care unit stay are substantial enough to justify the steep
financial cost of such a treatment. Indeed, it is already dif-
ficult for many clinicians to find the time to help patients
understand the medical risks and benefits of their treatment
alternatives. Including financial costs in such discussions
simply makes matters even more challenging.
Financial costs might be especially difficult for patients
to incorporate into clinical decisions, because such costs are
so hard to compare with health-related costs and benefits.
All decisions, of course, require people to make trade-offs.
But some trade-offs are harder to make than others. For ex-
ample, if patients face a trade-off between short-term mor-
tality and long-term mortality, they are comparing “apples
to apples.” They can decide what risk of death in the next
year they are willing to accept from aggressive treatment in
order to increase their chance for long-term survival.
Patients’ decisions become more difficult when they are
asked to compare apples to oranges, metaphorically speak-
ing of course. For instance, some decisions require patients
to make trade-offs between length of life and health-related
quality of life.
Now consider making a choice between money and life.
How much money would you spend for, say, a 5% increase
in your chance of surviving for 5 years? I expect that most
people have a very hard time making this kind of decision.
They cannot draw upon a great deal of experience in their
own lives where they have traded off money versus sur-
vival. In addition, it is hard to compare money to survival. If
choosing between length of life and quality of life is like
comparing apples to oranges, then choosing between
money and survival is like comparing apples to cell
phones—they don’t even feel like they belong in the same
general category.
I think of money and cancer as a triple whammy: just
when patients’ emotions are highest (new cancer diagno-
sis!), they are forced to talk about money for the first time
with their physician, and in the process must compare
their financial security with their chance for long-term
survival.
CONCLUSION
Physicians are increasingly recognizing that many medical
decisions are not purely medical decisions, but hinge on pa-
tient preferences. This recognition of patients’ preferences
has raised the challenge of finding ways to communicate
the costs and benefits of treatments in ways that patients not
only comprehend, but can also integrate with their own val-
ues to help the clinician determine what treatment choice is
best for that given patient.
The existence of extremely expensive new oncology
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treatments has created a new challenge for this paradigm of
shared decision making. Clinicians can expect to struggle
through this new challenge. In doing so, they should re-
member that helping patients understand the costs and ben-
efits of treatments is a crucial part of shared decision
making. But they also need to recognize that patients’ emo-
tions and intuitions will play a large role in the ultimate de-
cision that they make. Being aware of such emotions is a
crucial early step for clinicians to help their patients figure
out what is in their own best interests.
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